This book aims to answer a few key questions that are relevant in banking. Firstly, it aims to find if CAMEL-type indicators are able to predict subsequent decisions by regulators to fail banks. Secondly, it aims to find if depositors discipline banks by focusing on depositors' reaction to the price signal and the amount of risk-related information that banks disclose. The findings show that banks' probability of failure increases as a result of high reliance on external funding and depositors in East Asia are not sensitive to price signal but they are sensitive to the amount of information disclosure. This study also finds that depositors in East Asia reward good banks for disclosing more information but they do not discipline weak banks by demanding greater disclosure. This implies that disclosure is a more effective signal for healthy banks than for weak ones. These analyses provide support to the proposition of the third pillar of the Basel II which aims to encourage market discipline by requiring banks to disclose more risk-related information. This book should be especially useful to banks and banking regulators.