Executive compensation, especially in the financial sector, has long been the hot topic for debate. It recently got highlighted once again due to the global financial crisis that showed up as early as in 2008. The outcry is due to the existence of large proportion of performance-based compensation that encourages executives to take high risks in order to generate short-term profits, disregarding firm’s future vulnerabilities. The finding showed no formal evidence for above hypothesis although many researchers argued in favor of some sort of executive compensation regulation based on accepted Principles. The book provides insight to the issues like: reason for excessive rise in executive compensation and its relation with risk-taking behavior; principles for executive compensation regulation and global response, with emphasis on Nepal (the blunder of Nepalese regulator, the Central Bank, and need for immediate revocation); and the way forward. The book may be important for students, scholars/professionals, and anyone interested in this field for policy-advocacy purpose. Policy makers, regulators, and government authorities will find it helpful in the decision-making process.