This book focuses on the Kenyan mediation of the Somali conflict and strategic intervention engagement between 2002 and 2012. It reveals that Kenya’s diplomatic and stabilization efforts had their own dynamics and challenges. This is especially so with regard to the preferred policy option of exercising diplomacy that utilizes soft-power resources. This diplomacy had to contend with sensitive aspects of the process involving the complicated engagement with the Somali conflict-constituencies, and a complex mapping of various actors and interests. Contrary to the expected outcomes, interests and issues proliferated, and the original peace-making agenda was consistently slowed down and complicated. It recommends amongst other aspects that Kenya’s diplomacy should adopt a strategy of co-operation with those regional regimes that it helped to establish. A case in reference is utilizing regional arms control and disarmament diplomacy. This is Kenya’s intermediary co-operative role with the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA). The book will appeal to students, pedantic analysts and policy practitioners in the fields of international relations, diplomacy and strategic-security affairs.