The financial crisis of 2008 led to the most severe recession since the one, which began in 1929. Economists worldwide see burst of the real estate bubble in the USA as one of the main factors that started the chain reaction at the early stage of the crisis. They therefore blame banks’ excessive lending activity as the main cause of the bubble formation. But was it really the banking sector, that made housing prices deviate so much from their fundamentals as to grow later in the bubble? This book looks at the causes of the financial crisis by considering to what extend and how liquidity in the banking sector could have triggered the bubble formation. Chapter one elaborates on the existing literature, related to the topic, identifying areas, which have not been covered by the on-going academic discussion yet. The second chapter contains the main body of the research, including data description, its analysis and the econometric models used. The third chapter draws the conclusion and poses questions for future research: how did the deteriorating lending standards contribute to the real estate bubble formation? Is there interconnection between the derivative bubble and the real estate ones? What is the nature of this interconnection?