This research is an enquiry to find an electoral formula that conforms to Canadian constitutional values. Three core values that are pertinent to the issue of electoral systems are identified: democracy, diversity, and efficiency. Each of these core values is divided into different aspects. These aspects will form the backbone of the evaluation of different electoral systems in this work. I begin with an evaluation of the plurality model of elections, which is currently used in Canada. I demonstrate that many of the attributes of the current system are not in tune with Canadian constitutional values. Next, I examine proportional systems and demonstrate that these systems too have problems of their own. In the next stage, I make a new proposal for elections to the Canadian Parliament. I introduce a new variant of the majority model, which I call a majority-preferential two-round variant. I demonstrate that this new variant will outperform the other variants in the attainment of values. Finally, I argue that the combination of a House of Commons elected through the majority-preferential formula and a proportionally elected Senate will result in a more balanced approach to the values.