Revision with unchanged content. Thomas Kuhn with his classic The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one of the most influential and widely read philosophers of the 20th century. Kuhn's idea that meanings of scientific terms change is often taken to be refuted by recent advances in the philosophy of language. Meaning Changes challenges this interpretation showing that meaning change in Kuhn has multiple aspects: philosophical, cognitive and historical. The book demonstrates that the origin of Kuhn's view lies in his studies of history and argues that his case against Hilary Putnam's causal theory of reference constitutes serious criticism of the account. The author also explains how Kuhn's philosophy is supported by cognitive science and why meaning change is relevant to the history of ideas. The book concludes by analysing Kuhn's 'historical perspective' in the coherentist epistemological framework, which regards the question of scientific progress ultimately as an empirical one. This book will be of particular interest to students and scholars of the history and philosophy of science. It also is valuable reading to anybody interested in philosophy or scientific change.