This book explores Russell’s motivation to develop a theory of meaning in logic and language. His philosophy of logical atomism is s a complex account of logic, language, metaphysics, and epistemology where the discussion focuses on his `linguistic’ revolution. He accepts Frege’s notion of reference but criticises Frege’s account of sense. His obsession with the naming relation leads him towards a traditional empiricism and raises some important questions about the role of names and descriptions in natural language. Dummett thinks that Russell’s adherence to traditional metaphysics and epistemology can be resolved when an adequate theory of meaning can be provided. Kripke argues that Russell’s identification of ordinary proper names as descriptions is wrong. Sainsbury, Evans, and Peacocke being critical of Russell’s views, think that Russell’s account of meaning can be rescued. Evans, Millican, and McCulloch are particularly concerned with the contrast between a semantic and a pragmatic use of language. Russell’s overall view attempts to show that his account of a `perfect’ language has some implication for understanding the analysis of expressions in natural language.