This piece of work examines the relationship between ownership structure via the separation of cash flow and voting right and its impact on executive compensation in Swedish list companies. It is important to note that little empirical research has been done on this issue concerning Sweden and the Nordic region in general. A cross sectional anaysis of data on the various variables were used to obtain important result and adding more literature to the Corporate Governance System used in the scandinavia and Sweden in particular. This writing brings into light works of other authors and how their findings relate to each other and more importantly how our work converges and/or diverges from theirs. A rational of a good CEO pay scheme is also outlined and the different schools of thoughts to explain their views on CEO pay and ownership structure of a firm. This work also examines the devices used by Swedish listed firms in order to separate ownership from control. It would be very interesting to navigate this material to find out what these devices are, what they have in common and how they affect CEO pay.