Revision with unchanged content. This book emerges out of the notion that Security Council’s Title VII interventions follow a decision making process that weighs not only on legal interpretations of threat to international peace and security but also on common triggers and frequently cited moral reasoning. Thus it examines the main factors that inform the Council’s Title VII decision-making process by comparatively analyzing its involvement in Bosnia, Iraq, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. The focus of analysis is on the Council’s elements of concern, strategies used by actors and employed by the Security Council, the roles historical and contemporary contexts play in the development, containment, prosecution and sustenance of violent conflicts, and the level of consistency of communicative interactions among the Security Council and international human rights practitioners. A comparative analysis of Security Council resolutions, U.N documents, Amnesty International annual reports, New York Times and London Guardian editorials and articles on violent conflicts in Bosnia, Iraq, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 2000 suggests that the Council’s primary elements of concern were the protection of state functions, diplomatic operations and regime ties. However, the Council frequently and conveniently utilized gross human rights violations as the moral and legal basis for its Title VII decisions.